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Taking power tools to the acquis - The Court of Justice, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and European Union Copyright Law 
 





As is well known, copyright law is only partially harmonized in the European Union.1 
While several important Directives have been adopted, a number of key issues 
continue to fall within the scope of national law. Nevertheless, over the last few years, 
the Court of Justice has interpreted the legislative acquis in a manner that has done a 
great deal to develop a more fully articulated body of copyright rules. It has assumed 
responsibility for several issues that might reasonably have been considered to fall 
within Member State competence2 and, as a result, a number of apparent gaps in the 
coverage of the relevant secondary legislation have been filled. In fleshing out the 
skeletal framework in this way, the Court has increasingly been guided by the 
apparent requirements of the rights enshrined in the Union’s Charter of Fundamental 
																																																						
* Professor of Intellectual Property Law, School of Law, Queen Mary University of 
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1 For ease of argument, the term ‘European Union’ is used throughout here to describe 
both the European Union and predecessor bodies. 
2 See, for example, the consideration of the originality/creativity standard in Case C-
5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] EU:C:2009:465 
and the regulation of copyright ownership in Case C-277/10 Luksan v Van der Let 
[2011] EU:C:2012:65.  
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Rights. 3  This development has been described as ‘constitutionalization’. 4  In this 
chapter, I sketch the process of constitutionalization and consider whether it is likely 
to lead to the further development of rules at European Union level without need for 
further legislative intervention. In particular, I investigate, first, whether it might 
result in the establishment of a more comprehensive and more fully harmonized set of 
exceptions in Union copyright law.5 Secondly, I ask whether it might also lead to the 
recognition of a broader range of rights (both economic and non-economic) for 
authors and other right-holders.6  
 
 
1. The Constitutionalization of European Copyright Law 
 
For many years, the fundamental rights protected under the ECHR and in national 
legal systems have been recognized as ‘general principles’ of Union law against the 
background of which copyright law must be interpreted. Thus, for example, in 1998, 
																																																						
3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/1, 18 December 
2000. For detailed discussion of the Charter, see S Peers et al, The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: a Commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
4 See, for example, C Geiger, ‘Constitutionalising’ intellectual property law? The 
influence of fundamental rights on intellectual property in the European Union’ 
(2006) IIC 371; J Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, 
the right of property and European copyright law’ (2013) European Law Review 65; 
T Mylly, ‘The constitutionalisation of the European legal order: impact of human 
rights on intellectual property in the EU’ in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on 
Human Rights (Edward Elgar, 2015) 103; J Schovsbo, ‘Constitutional foundations 
and constitutionalization of IPR law’ (2015) Zeitschrift für Geistiges Eigentum 383. 
5 The term ‘exceptions’ is used throughout this chapter, even though ‘exceptions and 
limitations’ is used generally in the legislative acquis. 
6 The arguments advanced in this chapter may, in some instances, apply both to the 
authors of ’works’ and to the holders of rights in other forms of protected subject-
matter (often described as ‘related rights’). For simplicity’s sake, the text refers to 
authors only. 
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in (C-200/96) Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH,7 the Court 
considered a reference from the Köln Regional Court relating to the validity of Art 
1(1) of the Rental and Lending Right Directive,8 which requires Member States to 
provide rights to control the rental and lending to the public of works and other 
subject-matter. In the domestic proceedings, the defendant, who had been prevented 
from renting out compact discs bearing recorded music, challenged the validity of Art 
1 and its domestic implementation on the ground that they breached the defendant’s 
fundamental right to trade freely as a rental business. The Court noted that “according 
to settled case-law, the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, and likewise the right 
to property, form part of the general principles of [Union] law”9 but went on to hold 
that:  
 
‘[T]he general principle of freedom to pursue a trade or profession cannot be 
interpreted in isolation from the general principles relating to protection of 
intellectual property rights and international obligations entered into in that 
sphere by the Community and by the Member States. Since it does not appear 
that the objectives pursued could have been achieved by measures which 
preserved to a greater extent the entrepreneurial freedom of individuals or 
undertakings specialising in the commercial rental of phonograms, the 
consequences of introducing an exclusive rental right cannot be regarded as 
disproportionate and intolerable.”10 
																																																						
7 28 April 1998, ECR [1998] I-1953. 
8 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights relating to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version) OJ No L 376/28, 27 
December 2006. 
9 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] EU:C:1998:172. Para 21.  
10 Ibid. [26]. 
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This passage indicates a form of scrutiny within which the rights of copyright owners 
(‘protection of intellectual property rights’) are balanced against those of users of 
copyright works (‘freedom to pursue a trade or profession’) in a loose assessment of 
proportionality. 
 
This substratum of fundamental rights was considered again in copyright proceedings 
in (C-479/04) Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet,11 a reference for a preliminary 
ruling concerning the interpretation and validity of Art 4(2) of the Information 
Society Directive, which requires Member States to implement a system of regional 
(as opposed to international) exhaustion of distribution rights. 12  Laserdisken, a 
commercial company selling copies of cinematographic works which had previously 
relied upon a system of international exhaustion of rights to obtain its goods, 
considered that the change in Danish law arising from the implementation of the 
Directive had adversely affected its commercial interests. It challenged the validity of 
this provision of the Directive before the national courts on a number of grounds and 
a series of questions were referred to the Court of Justice. Amongst these, the Court 
raised the potential incompatibility of the rule of regional exhaustion enshrined in Art 
4(2) with the right of freedom of expression. In relation to freedom of expression, the 
Court stated that: 
																																																						
11 12 September 2006, ECR [2006] I-8098. 
12 Under a system of international exhaustion, the distribution right relating to a 
particular copy of a copyright work is exhausted on the first transfer of ownership of 
the copy with the consent of the copyright owner anywhere in the world. Under the 
system of regional exhaustion applicable within the European Economic Area under 
the Information Society Directive, the distribution right relating to a particular copy of 
a copyright work is only exhausted on the first transfer of ownership of the copy with 
the consent of the right-holder within the European Economic Area. Transfers outside 
that area do not exhaust the distribution right. 
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…[A]ccording to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of 
the general principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures, and…, 
for that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international 
treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has special 
significance in that respect…Freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 10 of 
the ECHR, is a fundamental right the observance of which is ensured by the 
Community courts…The same is true of the right to property, which is 
guaranteed by Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR…13 
In this particular instance, the Court concluded that a mandatory rule of regional 
exhaustion did not breach the right of freedom of expression protected under Art 10, 
ECHR because it was “justified in the light of the need to protect intellectual property 
rights, including copyright, which form part of the right to property.” The outcome in 
Laserdisken was similar to that in Metronome Musik, in that the challenge to the 
constitutionality of Union secondary legislation was dismissed in a cursory manner.14 
Nevertheless, the Court’s explicit reference to the analytical framework established 
under the ECHR hints at a potentially more disciplined framework for the application 
of fundamental rights than that employed in Metronome Musik.15 
																																																						
13 Case C-479/04 Laserdisken  [2006EU:C:2006:549, paras 61-62.  
14 In analysing the impact of fundamental rights in the Court’s intellectual property 
jurisprudence, Mylly has characterised the period during which Metronome Musik and 
Laserdisken were decided as one of ’rejection and ignorance’ of constitutional 
arguments. See T Mylly ‘The constitutionalisation of the European legal order: 
impact of human rights on intellectual property in the EU’, in C Geiger (ed), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights (Edward Elgar, 2015) 103, 107.  
15 The rule of regional exhaustion enshrined in Art 4(2) was also challenged under the 
principle of equal treatment. However, the Court held that Laserdisken were seeking 
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The judgment in (C-275/06) Promusicae,16  handed down only a year or so after 
Laserdisken and a year and a half before the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
accorded a decidedly more significant role to the fundamental rights enshrined in 
Union law. As such, the Judgment was something of a breakthrough. In the domestic 
proceedings, an organization representing producers and publishers of musical and 
audiovisual recordings sought an order requiring an internet service provider to 
disclose the identities of a number of the service provider’s customers suspected of 
committing copyright infringement. The national court asked whether the Union’s 
legal framework required Member States to impose a legal obligation upon service 
providers to communicate customers’ personal data in such circumstances in order to 
ensure the effective protection of copyright via civil proceedings. The reference 
involved the potential application of several Directives concerning remedies for 
intellectual property infringement and data privacy.17   In the view of the Court, a 
national decision-making body considering such a situation was required to reconcile 
competing fundamental rights protected within the European legal order - namely the 
right to respect for private life on the one hand and the rights to protection of property 
and to an effective remedy on the other. These rights are both recognized as ‘general 
principles’ of Union law and are explicitly protected under the Charter of 
																																																																																																																																																											
to compare situations which were manifestly distinct ((Case C-479/04) Laserdisken 
[67]-[70]). 
16 Case C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefónica de España [2008] EU:C:2008:54.   
17Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the internal market; Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.  
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Fundamental Rights. According to the Court, the legislation does not oblige Member 
States to recognize a legal obligation upon ISPs to communicate personal data of 
suspected infringers. However, Union law requires that, when transposing the relevant 
Directives:  
…the Member States take care to rely on an interpretation of them which allows 
a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by 
the Community legal order. Further, when implementing the measures 
transposing those directives, the authorities and courts of the Member States 
must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those 
directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation of them 
which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other 
general principles of Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.18 
Thus, in the absence of clear legislative rules, the fundamental rights established 
under the Charter serve to guide the development of national rules within the 
framework of Union law. 
 
In 2009, not long after the Court’s Judgment in Promusicae, the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force. Under this Treaty, the Charter has equivalent status to the founding EU 
Treaties19 and the Court has an explicit obligation to ensure that all activities of Union 
institutions and Member States implementing Union law20 are compatible with the 
																																																						
18 Case C-275/06) Promusicae v Telefónica de España [2008] EU:C:2008:54,  para 
70.  
Article 6(1), Treaty of the European Union, 
20 While Article 51(1) of the Charter states that the provisions of the Charter are 
addressed to Member States only when they are ‘implementing Union law’, this 
restriction has been held not to depart from the position adopted by the CJEU before 
the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty (ie, that Member States are obliged to 
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rights protected under the Charter.21 Unsurprisingly, given the enhanced role accorded 
to the Charter, the Court has begun to make much more frequent reference to the 
requirements of the Charter since 2009. This development has given it the tools and 
the confidence to hold that certain provisions of Union legislation are void because 
they contravene Charter rights.22  While the consequences in copyright law have not 
yet been particularly dramatic, the Court’s analysis of the relevant secondary 
legislation has come increasingly to be conducted within a framework provided by the 
Charter. The idea of the ‘fair balance’ between competing rights traced in Promusicae 
has become progressively more prominent in this respect. 
 
In identifying this ’fair balance’, a number of fundamental rights have been identified 
as relevant. The most obvious of these is the right of property which, in addition to 
being protected under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR (as in Laserdisken) 23 and as 
a general principle of Union law (as in Metronome Musik), is enshrined in Article 17 
																																																																																																																																																											
ensure compliance with EU fundamental rights both when implementing EU 
obligations and when acting within a derogation from such obligations). See Case C-
617/10) Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] EU:C:2013:105, 2 CMLR 46 
(CJEU, Gd Chamber); Case C-390/12 Proceedings brought by Pfleger [2014] 
EU:C:2014:281, 3 CMLR 47; cf Case C-106/13 Fierro & Marmorale v Ronchi, 
[2013] EU:C:2013:357; Case C-14/13, Cholakova, [2013] EU:C:2013:374. 
21 Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that “In so far as this Charter contains rights 
which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection”. Article 52(4) provides that “In so far as this 
Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those 
traditions.” 
22 See, for example, Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-
Achats ASBL [2011] EU:C:2011:100; Case C-92/09 & 93/09, Volker und Markus 
Schecke GbR, [2010] EU:C:2010:662; Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v 
Minister for Communications, Marine & Natural Resources, [2014] EU:C:2014:238; 
Case C-362/14, Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, [2015] EU:C:2015:650. 
23 The European Court of Human Rights has also acknowledged that rightholders in 
copyright works are protected by Article 1, Prot 1. See Ashby-Donald v France 
(36769/08) 10 January 2013; Neij v Sweden (40397/12) [2013] ECDR 7. 
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of the Charter.24 The application of the fundamental right of property to intellectual 
property rights, such as copyright, is confirmed by Art 17(2) of the Charter, which 
provides that: 
 
“Intellectual property shall be protected.”25 
 
The Court has explained that this Delphic statement serves simply to dispel any doubt 
whether intellectual property rights are covered by Art 17(1)’s general property 
guarantee, rather than to instigate some form of special super-protected status for 
intellectual property. 26  Post-Lisbon, in a series of cases in which the Court has 
interpreted provisions of the Directives in the area of copyright law, Art 17 has 
provided an important weight on rightholders’ side of the ‘fair balance’. An example 
is provided by (C-145/10) Eva-Maria Painer v StandardVerlags GmbH, concerning 
																																																						
24 For discussion of the right of property as it applies to intellectual property in the 
European legal order, see P Oliver & C Stothers, ‘Intellectual property under the 
Charter: Are the Court’s scales properly calibrated?’ (2017) Common Market Law 
Review (forthcoming). 
For critique of the Court’s application of the right to property in its copyright 
jurisprudence, see J Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of 
Justice, the right of property and European copyright law’ (2013) European Law 
Review 65;  T Mylly, ‘The constitutionalisation of the European legal order: impact 
of human rights on intellectual property in the EU’ in C Geiger (ed), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015) 103; A 
Peukert, ‘The fundamental right to (intellectual) property and the discretion of the 
legislature’ in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook, ibid, 132; M Husovec, ‘Intellectual 
property rights and integration by conflict: the past, present and future’ (2016) 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 239. 
25 There were initial fears that Art 17(2) indicated that intellectual property was to be 
accorded relatively unqualified protection under the Charter. See, C Geiger, 
’Intellectual property shall be protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union: a mysterious provision with an unclear scope’ (2009) 
EIPR 113; A Peukert, ‘Intellectual property as an end in itself?’ (2011) EIPR 67.  
26 See, for example, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v SABAM [2011] EU:C:2011:771 
para 43; Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] 
EU:C:2014:192 para 61. For further discussion of art 17(2), see P Torremans, ‘Article 
17(2) in S Peers et al, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Commentary (Hart 
Publishing, 2014).  
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Art 5(3)(d) of the Information Society Directive, which permits Member States to 
maintain or to implement exceptions for the purpose of quotation. In Painer, the 
Court held that Art 5(3)(d) was intended to strike a fair balance between copyright 
users’ rights of freedom of expression and ‘the reproduction right conferred on 
authors’.27 While the reproduction right is not explicitly described here as having 
fundamental status, the reference to the need to establish a ‘fair balance’ and the 
acknowledgement of equivalence between the reproduction right and the right of 
freedom of expression indicate that the Court views the interpretation of Art 5(3)(d) 
as a task to be carried out within a framework provided by the rights protected under 
the Charter and that the claimant’s right to control the reproduction of a copyright 
work is one such right. 
 
Since Painer, copyright’s status as ‘property’ has been explicitly noted in several 
cases concerning the scope of the rights granted under the legislative acquis,28 the 
exceptions to those rights 29  and the remedies available to right-holders against 
intermediaries.30 In all such cases, Art 17 provides an interpretative steer in favour of 
the right-holder. The Charter’s right of property has also played a potentially even 
more significant role in one post-Lisbon Judgment. In (C-277/10) Luksan v Van der 
																																																						
27 Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v StandardVerlags GmbH [2011] 
EU:C:2013:138, para 134. 
28 See, for example, Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV 
[2016]  EU:C:2016:644 para 31.  
29 See, for example, Case C-201/13 Deckmyn v Vandersteen [2014] EU:C:2014:2132 
para 27.  
30 See Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v SABAM [2011] EU:C:2011:771; Case C-
360/10, SABAM v Netlog NV [2012] EU:C:2012:85 ; Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio 
AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB [2012] EU:C:2012:219 ; Case C-314/12 
UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] EU:C:2014:192; Case C-
484/14 McFadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, [2016] 
EU:C:2016:689.  
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Let,31 the Court held that a provision of Austrian law, which vested exploitation rights 
in a cinematographic work in the producer rather than the director of that work 
violated the fundamental guarantee of property in the EU’s legal order. The Court 
held that the Information Society Directive implicitly required the principal director 
of a cinematographic work to be treated as an author of such a work and, accordingly, 
to benefit from exploitation rights. As a result, any national provision which did not 
vest exploitation rights in the director “by operation of law, directly and originally” 
was inevitably in breach of the Directive.32 This aspect of the Court’s judgment is 
based purely on an interpretation of the legislative acquis. However, having come to 
this conclusion, the Court went on to hold that failure to allocate the exploitation 
rights at issue to the principal director would not only breach the Directive but would 
also violate his or her fundamental right to property. The national rule at issue was not 
“consistent with the requirements flowing from Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights guaranteeing the protection of intellectual property”.33 
 
This finding is interesting because it effectively accords entrenched status to the 
Union’s legislative rules on copyright, at least in so far as they concern the existence 
and vesting of rights. If a Member State departs from the attribution of rights 
established under the acquis, it will not only have acted incompatibly with secondary 
legislation, it will also necessarily have violated the Charter. In Luksan, the reference 
																																																						
31 Case C-277/10 Luksan v Van der Let [2012] EU:C:2012:65. This section of the 
chapter draws upon the description of the Court’s Judgment in J Griffiths, 
‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right of property and 
European copyright law’ (2013) European Law Review 65. 
32 In the words of the Court: “Since the status of author has been accorded to the 
principal director of a cinematographic work, it would prove incompatible with the 
aim pursued by [the Information Society Directive] to accept that [the creator should] 
be denied the exploitation rights at issue.” 
33 Ibid., [70]-[71]. 
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to Art 17 seems something of an afterthought. However, this principle is likely to 
enhance the arsenal of weapons available to right-holders in copyright litigation.34 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the effect of the Judgment may extend beyond 
the provisions of the acquis in which rights are allocated to authors and others. It has, 
for example, been suggested that an author’s right to property may necessarily be 
violated whenever the scope of an exception in national law is more expansively 
interpreted at national level than is permitted under EU law.35 
 
However, as will have been apparent from the discussion of the concept of ‘fair 
balance’ above, the right of property is not the only fundamental right that will guide 
the Court of Justice in its interpretation of the copyright Directives. On the user’s side 
of the balance, a substantial weight is provided by the right of freedom of expression 
and information under Art 11 of the Charter.36 In Laserdisken, it will be recalled, the 
claimant challenged the validity of the Information Society Directive’s mandatory 
rule of regional exhaustion on the ground of alleged incompatibility with the right of 
freedom of expression 37   and, in Painer, the Court confirmed that the quotation 
exception in EU law was underpinned by that right.38 Subsequently, in a series of 
cases concerning the availability of remedies against intermediaries, the interests of 
the intermediaries’ customers have been held to be covered by the right protected 
																																																						
34 The ability of domestic courts to enforce Directives directly is limited. See Case C-
351/12 OSA, [2014] EU:C:2014:110paras 42-48.  
35 For criticism of this potential consequence of the principle established in Luksan, 
see T Mylly, ‘The constitutionalisation of the European legal order: impact of human 
rights on intellectual property in the EU’ in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015) 103, 120-125. 
36 The use of a copyright work is also covered by the right of freedom of expression 
under the ECHR. See Ashby-Donald v France (36769/08) 10 January 2013; Neij v 
Sweden (40397/12) [2013] ECDR 7. 
37 Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet [2006] EU:C:2006:549.  
38 Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v StandardVerlags GmbH [2011] 
EU:C:2011:798para 135. 
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under Art 11 of the Charter.39 The relevance of this right has also been confirmed by 
the Court in cases concerning the scope of the rights granted under the Directives 
adopted in the area of copyright law40 and the application of the limitations and 
exceptions to those rights.41  
 
In addition to the generally opposed rights of property and freedom of expression and 
information, the Court has acknowledged that other Charter rights might also be 
relevant to the interpretation of the secondary legislation on copyright law. Prominent 
amongst these have been Art 16, which codifies the right relied upon by the 
complainant in Metronome Musik. Thus, for example, a broadcasting organisation’s 
freedom to conduct a business has been held to militate in favour of a generous 
interpretation of the exception permitting the making of ephemeral copies of 
copyright works under Art 5(2)(d) of the Information Society Directive42 and, in the 
series of cases in which the Court has been required to consider the availability of 
remedies against intermediaries (such as disclosure, filtering and blocking orders), the 
intermediary’s interest in avoiding the time and expense of implementing anti-
infringement measures has been held to fall within the scope of Art 16. 43 
Additionally, in the cases concerning intermediaries, customers’ rights to respect for 
																																																						
39 See, for example, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959 
[50]-[53]; Case C-360/10) SABAM v Netlog NV [2012] ECR 0000 [48]-[51]; Case C-
314/12 UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] ECDR 12 [55]-[56]; 
Case C-484/14 McFadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, 15 
September 2016 [90]-[101]. 
40 See, for example, Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV 
[31], [45]. 
41 See, for example, Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v Vandersteen [2011] EU:C:2011:771,[ 
paras 25 - 27 
42 See Case C-510/10 DR, TV2 Danmark AS v NCB – Nordisk Copyright Bureau 
[2012], EU:C:2012:244. Para 57. 
43 See, for example, See, for example, Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v SABAM 
[2011] EU:C:2011:771 paras 46-49; Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film 
Verleih GmbH [2014] EU:C:2014:192 paras 47-51. 
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private and family life, home and communications under Art 7 of the Charter and 
rights to the protection of personal data under Art 8 have also been held to be relevant 
to the determination of an appropriate balance between competing rights.44  
 
The rights outlined above have now come to play an established role in EU copyright 
discourse. In addition, the Court has sometimes highlighted the relevance of other 
rights protected under the Charter. Thus, for example, in (C-463/12) Copydan 
Båndkopi, it was held that provisions of Art 5 of the Information Society Directive 
must always be applied in a manner that respects the Charter’s right of equal 
treatment under Art 20 45  and, in (C-201/13) Deckmyn v Vandersteen, the Court 
concluded that a national court must take into account the potentially discriminatory 
nature of a parody in determining whether the ‘fair balance’ of competing rights 
favours the rightholder or the parodist in a copyright dispute.46 In Deckmyn, it was 
noted that the principle of non-discrimination is reflected both in EU secondary 
legislation47 and in Art 21 of the Charter. 
 
Overall, it can be seen that the Charter has begun to play an increasingly prominent 
role in EU copyright jurisprudence, having been relied upon to provide a framework 
of underlying principle for the interpretation of the acquis, particularly in areas only 
lightly regulated by legislation. As such, the Charter has supported the elaboration 
																																																						
44 Case C-70/10) Scarlet Extended v SABAM [2011] EU:C:2011:771 para 50. 
45  Case C-463/12) Copydan Båndkopi v Nokia Danmark A/S, [2015] EU:C:2015:144. 
Note the impact of the application of this principle paras 30-41. 
46 Case C-201/13) Deckmyn v Vandersteen, 3 September [2014] EU:C:2014:2132 
para 31. 
47 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
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and extension of harmonized copyright rules at EU level.48 At the same time, the shift 
towards a Charter-based theorisation of copyright law has thrown some established 
principles of copyright law into doubt. It is, for example, difficult to see how the strict 
approach to the interpretation of copyright exceptions endorsed in (C-5/08) Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening49 can apply where a court (either at 
Union or national level) is obliged to identify a ‘fair balance’ between competing 
rights.50 Indeed, it can be suggested that, if the constitutionalization of copyright law 
is pursued to its logical conclusion, a number of other interesting consequences may 
follow. 
 
Some of the potential effects of a Charter-based approach are considered in the 
following two sections of this chapter. The first outlines the possible impact of this 
interpretative methodology on the copyright exceptions in Union law and the second 
investigates the possibility that reliance on the Charter might oblige the Court to 
recognize additional rights, both economic and non-economic, for authors and others. 
This order of discussion – exceptions first, then rights – may appear contra-intuitive. 
The sections are set out in this way because, while the consequences in the area of 
copyright exceptions can be predicted to materialize with some confidence, those 




48 For further detail of this argument, see J Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or 
harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right of property and European copyright law’ 
(2013) European Law Review 65. 
49 See Case C-5/08) Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [52009] 
EU:C:2009:465, paras 56 - 58. 
50 For support of this position, see also J Schovsbo, ‘Constitutional foundations and 
constitutionalization of IPR law’ [2015] Zeitschrift für Geistiges Eigentum 383, 391. 
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2. Potential consequences of the constitutionalization of copyright law – 
copyright exceptions 
 
The brief review of the constitutionalization process above demonstrates that the 
rights protected under the Charter have already had some impact on the interpretation 
of the exceptions permitted under the acquis. However, a rights-focused approach 
may also have further structural impacts. Some of these are discussed in this section, 
which is divided into two parts. The first considers whether reliance on the Charter 
necessarily means that a number of ostensibly optional copyright exceptions are, in 
fact, mandatory for Member States as a matter of EU law.  The second asks whether a 
commitment to an interpretative methodology guided by fundamental rights will 
inevitably introduce a degree of flexibility into the apparently closed legislative 
framework for copyright exceptions in Union law. 
 
a. Mandatory exceptions and limitations 
 
Exceptions are a particular weakness from the perspective of the copyright 
harmonization programme. A specific, fully-harmonized regime of exceptions applies 
to software.51 However, for works more generally, there are only a small number of 
mandatory exceptions at EU level.52  In most cases, Member States may choose to 
																																																						
51 See Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (codified version), Arts 5-6. 
52 See, for example, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of the 11th March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, Art 6(1); Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, Art 5(1); Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works (Text with 
EEA relevance). 
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adopt exceptions permitted under the acquis or not.53 As a consequence, there is 
considerable diversity in national practice. Art 5 of the Information Society Directive, 
sets out a list of optional provisions for Member States. The application of several of 
these exceptions has now been reviewed by the Court, which has confirmed that, even 
though the adoption of these provisions is described as optional, they are all to be 
interpreted autonomously as a matter of EU law.54 It has also been argued that it is a 
necessary inference from the Court’s case-law on exceptions that, if a Member State 
chooses to adopt a particular exception under Art 5, it must take the exception in its 
entirety (and as interpreted by the Court).55 As a consequence, it is suggested, more 
tightly restricted national exceptions cannot be carved out within the outer limits 
provided by the relevant provision of Art 5. This interpretation has clear harmonizing 
potential because it puts the Court in a position to define both the upper and lower 
limits of all the permitted exceptions. However, it runs counter to the understanding 
of the effect of Art 5 that prevailed at the time the Directive was adopted and 
implemented in Member States. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these steps towards a more uniform set of rules on copyright 
exceptions in the Union, an obvious obstacle to the establishment of a fully 
harmonized regime remains. While, the definition of each of the provisions in Art 5 
																																																						
53 See, for example, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of the 11th March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, Art 2;  Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, Art 5(2)-(4); Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
relating to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version), Art 10. 
54 See, for example, Case C-510/10 DR, TV2 Danmark AS v NCB – Nordisk 
Copyright Bureau [2012] EU:C:2012:244, paras 34 and 36; Case C-201/13 Deckmyn 
v Vandersteen [2014] EU:C:2014:2132, paras 14 and 17. 
55 See, for example, E Rosati, ‘Copyright in the EU: in search of (in)flexibilities)’ 
(2014) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 585. 
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may be a matter of EU law, Member States appear to retain the prerogative whether to 
select a particular provision or not. Unless and until all Member States choose the 
same provisions from the list of options (and they have not done so to date), diversity 
will prevail. On the face of it, it is difficult to see what the Court can do to overcome 
this obstacle. However, the process of constitutionalization described above may 
mitigate its effects to a considerable extent. In (C-201/13) Deckmyn v Vandersteen,56 
it was held that: 
 
…[T]he application, in a particular case, of the exception for parody, within 
the meaning of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, must strike a fair balance 
between, on the one hand, the interests and rights of [right-holders] and, on the 
other, the freedom of expression of the user of a protected work who is relying 
on the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 5(3)(k).57 
 
Under this approach, in some instances, the ‘fair balance’ between competing rights 
will inevitably favour the user. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
this could be the case. Consider, for example, a situation in which a non-commercial 
user transforms a copyright work in a proportionate, non-discriminatory, non-
substitutive manner in order to make a humorous political point about the transformed 
work itself. In such circumstances, there is a high chance (i) that the use of the work 
would be covered by the definition of ‘parody’ established in Deckmyn and (ii) that 
the ‘fair balance’ assessment would favour the parodist. Under the Court’s rights-
based analysis, in this instance, the parodist’s freedom of expression would prevail 
over the property interests of the right-holder. 
																																																						
56 Case C-201/13 Deckmyn v Vandersteen, [2014] EU:C:2014:2132. 
57 Ibid. para 27.  
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If this is indeed the case, the use in question must not only be sheltered under a 
national provision implementing Art 5(3)(k) as an option. It must necessarily be 
permitted. Any Member State considering the application of the acquis’s exclusive 
rights against a parodist in such a case would be acting within the scope of EU law. 
Accordingly, the Charter, including the right of freedom of expression and 
information protected under Art 11, would be relevant. Where that fair balance of 
rights favours the parodist, it ought not to be open to a Member State to argue that it 
does not have to shelter the parody from a claim of infringement because it has not 
chosen to implement a national provision under Art 5(3)(k). Effectively, in such 
circumstances, some form of exception for parody is mandatory.58 The obligation to 
ensure freedom of expression under the Charter must prevail over the provisions of 
secondary law describing the exceptions under Art 5 as optional. This will be the case 
whatever the formal mechanism employed to provide flexibility for parodies in a 
particular Member State. Thus, for example, In Germany, some parodies are 
permitted under the ‘free use’ doctrine 59  and, in Italy, some parodies are 
accommodated within a flexible infringement test.60 In Ireland, there is no obviously 
applicable exception for parody. Nevertheless, in all of those jurisdictions, just as 
much as in jurisdictions with parody exceptions that more or less resemble the text of 
Art 5(3)(k), uses in relation to which the ‘fair balance’ test favours freedom of 
expression must be permitted.  
																																																						
58 This conclusion has been noted elsewhere. See, for example, European Copyright 
Society, ‘Limitations and exceptions as key elements of the legal framework for 
copyright in the European union – Opinion on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-
201/13 Deckmyn’ available at https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/how-the-ecs-
works/ecs-opinions/ last accessed 15 September 2017. 
59 See, for example, Bild-Kunst v Focus (I ZR 117/00) [2005] ECDR 8 (BGH). 
60 See G Ali, ‘A Bay of Pigs Crisis in Southern Europe? Fan-dubbing and Parody in 
the Italian Peninsula’ [2015] EIPR 756. 
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Parody provides a reasonably clear example of the way in which some of the 
apparently optional provisions under Art 5 are, in reality, mandatory if the logic of 
constitutionalization is pursued to its necessary conclusion. However, it is not the 
only likely example of this process. Art 11, for example, may also cover some 
incidental uses of copyright works,61 and some uses of works for the purposes of 
quotation62 and/or press purposes.63 Again, in some cases in which the application of 
these exceptions is at issue, the ‘fair balance’ of rights must surely favour the user. 
Again, it would seem that those uses must be permitted as a matter of EU law. Other 
rights under the Charter could also have a similar effect. It is not difficult, for 
example, to imagine circumstances in which equivalent arguments might be 
constructed about the application of exceptions which are designed to secure the right 
to scientific research, 64 the right not to be discriminated against,65 the right to conduct 
a business66 or the right to freedom of the arts.67 
 
																																																						
61 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, Art 5(3)(i). 
62 Ibid., 5(3)(d). It has been suggested that the exception for quotation is mandatory 
under the Berne Convention. See S Ricketson & J Ginsburg, International Copyright 
& Neighbouring Rights – the Berne Convention and Beyond, 2nd ed (OUP, 2005) 
13.38  
63 Ibid., Article 5(3)(c). 
64 Art 13. The District Court of Amsterdam has already relied upon the right of 
scientific research to extend the range of situations covered by exceptions in national 
law. See M Caspers, “The role of Anne Frank’s diary and academic freedom for text 
and data mining”, Kluwer Copyright Blog, 20 January 2016, 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2016/01/20/the-role-of-anne-franks-diary-and-
academic-freedom-for-text-data-mining/. For discussion, see also M Husovec, 
“Intellectual property rights and integration by conflict: the past, present and future” 
[2016] Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 239, 259-261. 
65 Article 21. 
66 Article 16. 
67 Article 13. 
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b. Flexibility in the list of exceptions and limitations 
 
The discussion above indicates one probable ‘structural’ consequence of the 
recognition that certain uses of copyright works are supported by the fundamental 
rights of users. Primary Treaty obligations, such as those deriving from the Charter, 
prevail over both the Union’s secondary legislation and national implementing 
legislation. However, it is unlikely to be the only such consequence. The absence of 
an open-ended ’fair use’ or ‘flexible use’ defence in Union copyright law has been a 
matter of considerable controversy.68 The inclusion of a European equivalent of the 
’fair use’ clause in US copyright law could conceivably protect EU copyright law 
against the risk of redundancy and sclerosis in the face of technological and cultural 
change. 69  Others have countered that such a defence would be undesirably or 
impermissibly uncertain70 or that the acquis already permits considerable flexibility as 
it stands and, therefore, that the introduction of a specific fair use-type clause may, 
																																																						
68 For discussion, see P Torremans, ‘The perspective of the introduction of a 
European fair use clause’ in T-E Synodinou, Codification of European Copyright Law 
– Challenges & Perspectives (Wolters Kluwer, 2012) 319; B Hugenholtz, ‘Flexible 
copyright: can EU authors’ right accommodate fair use?’ in I Stamatoudi (ed), New 
Developments in international and EU Copyright Law (Wolters Kluwer, 2016) 417. 
69 For this argument, see J Griffiths, ‘Unsticking the Centre-Piece – the Liberation of 
European Copyright Law’ [2010] JIPITEC 1. See also The Wittem Group, ‘European 
Copyright Code’ (2011) EIPR 76, 81. 
70 For discussion of argument that the fair use doctrine may infringe international 
copyright law, see, for example, R Okediji, ‘Toward an International Fair Use 
Doctrine’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 75 (particularly 116-
130); H Cohen Jehoram, ‘Restrictions on Copyright and Their Abuse’ (2005) E.I.P.R 
359;Burrell and Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact, 2005; S 
Ricketson, ‘The three-step test, deemed quantities, libraries and closed exceptions’ 
(Centre for Copyright Studies, 2003), pp.147-154; T Newby, ‘What's fair here is not 
fair everywhere: does the American fair use doctrine violate international copyright 
law?’ (1999) Stanford L R 1633. 
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even if desirable, may not be necessary. 71  However, the process of 
constitutionalization described above may already have changed the terms of this 
debate 
 
Consider, for example, a situation in which the ‘fair balance’ of fundamental rights 
favours the free use of a copyright work while the use at issue is not obviously 
covered by an exception in national law. In such circumstances, a national court’s first 
impulse is likely to be to rely on the Charter to interpret national law as permissively 
as possible. 72 However, in some instances, interpretative freedom may be limited. 
Consider, for example, a situation in which it is deemed necessary, in the interests of 
freedom of expression, to permit the publication of an extract from a copyright work 
even though the work has never been lawfully made available to the public. In such 
circumstances, there may well be difficulties in interpreting any of the permitted 
national exceptions contra legem as applicable to the use at issue. However, even if 
the interpretative ingenuity of a national judge is defeated in such a case, a form of 
use protected under the Charter cannot be prohibited. The judge would be obliged to 
depart from the statutory scheme, presumably by relying directly on the Charter, in 
order to allow the use to take place. 
 
Given that this must be the case, Art 5 cannot provide a conclusive inventory of all 
permitted uses. Through recognition of the precedence of Charter rights, a degree of 
																																																						
71 See, for example, B Hugenholtz and M Senftleben, ‘Fair use in Europe: in search of 
flexibilities’, Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, November 
2011, available at 
<https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Fair%20Use%20Report%20PUB.pdf> 
accessed 15 October 2017.  
72 For discussion of an example of liberal interpretation by reference to constitutional 
standards, see E Adeney & C Antons, ‘The Germania 3 decision translated: the 
quotation exception before the German Constitutional Court’ (2013)EIPR 646. 
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flexibility has therefore already been introduced into the acquis. The Charter will not 
provide as wide a degree of judicial freedom to permit uses as is available under 
statutory fair use clauses. Nevertheless, it has considerable potential to ‘open’ the 
apparently closed acquis on exceptions.73 Consider, for example, the use of copyright 
works for the purpose of text-mining. Such use may fall within an existing national 
exception covered by Art 5(3)(a), which allows the use of work for the purpose of 
‘scientific research’ as long as the conditions set out in that provision are satisfied. 
However, such exceptions will not cover the use of copyright works for a commercial 
purpose. Imagine a situation in which a commercial organization develops a 
programme of text-mining research that, while having huge potential benefit for 
human health, is hampered by rightholders’ intransigence or insistence on excessive 
licence fees. In such a case, the ‘non-consumptive’ reproductions made by the 
research organization lie far from the ‘core’ of an author’s right to benefit from the 
exploitation of his or her work. Accordingly, the ‘fair balance’ between the right-
holder’s property interest in its corpus of text and the right of scientific research 
and/or human health would seem to favour free use of the protected materials. In such 
circumstances, the need to ensure compliance with the Charter would appear to justify 
departure from the apparently exhaustively-defined list of exceptions in Art 5.74 
																																																						
73 Conversely, it has been argued that constitutionalization could, to some extent, 
result in a loss of flexibility as a result of a form of ‘lock-in’ for policy outcomes 
supported fundamental rights. For discussion, see T Mylly, ‘The constitutionalisation 
of the European legal order: impact of human rights on intellectual property in the 
EU’ in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights (Edward Elgar, 2015) 
103, 127 et seq; J Schovsbo, ’Constitutional foundations and constitutionalization of 
IPR law’ (2015) Zeitschrift für Geistiges Eigentum 383, 390. 
74 This possibility has been noted by others. See M Husovec, ‘Intellectual property 
rights and integration by conflict: the past, present and future’ (2016) Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 239, 259-261 ;  A Ohly, ‘European fundamental 
rights & intellectual property’ in A Ohly and J Pila, The Europeanization of 
Intellectual Property Law (OUP, 2013) 145; A Peukert, ‘The fundamental right to 




3. Potential consequences of the constitutionalization of copyright – the 
rights of authors and others 
 
It can thus be seen that the process of constitutionalization, which began haltingly by 
reference to general principles of EU law and which has sometimes been applied to 
shore up orthodox exercises in legislative interpretation,75 may also have the capacity 
to produce fairly dramatic outcomes in copyright law. In the medium term, this 
process seems likely to contribute to the development of a more fully integrated set of 
rules on copyright exceptions. In the next section of this chapter, I consider whether 
the process might also an impact on the grant of rights, both economic and non-
economic, in EU law. 
 
The programme of harmonization is more fully realised in the case of the rights of 
authors and others than it is in the case of exceptions. However, it is not yet complete. 
A number of gaps and inconsistencies remain. 76  Thus, for example, the right to 
authorise the live performance of works remains a matter for national law77 and, while 
a right of adaptation is granted to certain specific categories of author,78 EU law does 
																																																																																																																																																											
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015) 132, 
134-5. 
75 See, for example, Case C-277/10 Luksan v Van der Let [2012] EU:C:2012:65.  
76 For discussion, see M van Eechoud et al, Harmonizing European Copyright Law – 
the Challenges of Better Lawmaking (Wolters Kluwer, 2009). 
77 See Case C-283/10 Circul Globus Bucuresti v Uniunea Compozitorilor si 
Muzicologilor din România, [2011]  EU:C:2011:772. 
78 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 11th 
March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, Art 5(b); Directive 2009/24/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection 
of computer programs (codified version), Article 4(1)(b). 
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not explicitly grant an adaptation right to the authors of works more generally. The 
moral rights of authors lie entirely outside the harmonization programme. In this 
section, my purpose is to investigate whether the constitutionalization process has the 
capacity to ‘complete’ some of these gaps; that is, to ask whether an author might be 
entitled to rely on the Charter in arguing that he or she should be permitted to control 
uses of works beyond the situations specified in the secondary legislation relating to 
copyright. This analysis focuses on two examples. The first is the potential impact of 
constitutionalization on the adaptation right in Union law and the second is the more 




a. A claim to an adaptation right relating to all categories of work?     
 
As a matter of national law in all Member States, authors are entitled to control the 
adaptation of their works. However, as noted above, the Union’s legislative acquis 
grants an adaptation right only to authors of certain specific categories of work. It can 
be argued that the right to control adaptations more generally is implicit within other 
exclusive rights under the Information Society Directive, most obviously, the 
reproduction right.79 However, it is by no means clear that this is the case. Can it be 
argued that the process of constitutionalization outlined in this chapter inevitably 
means that authors of all forms of work have a right to control the adaptation of their 
works as a matter of EU law? Even though such a right exists in the national laws of 
all Member States, the recognition of this right in Union law would be likely to have 
																																																						
79 This could be argued to be a necessary implication from reference to the Court in 
Case C-201/13 Deckmyn v Vandersteen [2014] EU:C:2014:2132. 
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significant impact. For example, if the right falls within the acquis, the Court of 
Justice, rather than national legislatures and/or courts, has authority to determine its 
scope. This is likely to affect the methodology for determining infringement in the 
Member States, where a high degree of diversity still prevails in relation to the 
appropriate approach to the analysis of infringement of copyright in altered form.  
  
The question of whether or not constitutionalization has this effect must be 
approached in two stages. First, it is necessary to determine whether or not the rights 
set out in the Charter are capable of forming a foundation for an author’s claim to a 
general right of adaptation. That is, to ask whether the claim to resist adaptation of a 
copyright work without permission is potentially covered by a fundamental rights 
claim? Secondly, it is also necessary to establish whether or not this issue (ie, the 
potential recognition of a general adaptation right) is one that lies within the scope of 
EU, as opposed to domestic, law. It was not necessary to consider this second 
question in assessing the potential impact of constitutionalization on the copyright 
exceptions above because any court considering the application of an exception to the 
rights granted under the copyright Directives would necessarily be implementing EU 
law. The cause of action at issue would clearly involve the enforcement of rights 
established under EU secondary legislation. However, in analysing the potential 
impact of the Charter on a claim to a right that has not explicitly been granted under 
the acquis, the second question is much more pertinent. 
 
At the first stage, the fundamental right with most obvious relevance to this situation 
is the right of property under Art 17 of the Charter. However, this right has important 
limitations which may prevent it from serving as a foundation for such a claim. The 
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right of property in the European legal order (as a general principle of EU law, under 
Art 1, Prot 1 of the ECHR and under Art 17) is a right against unjustified interference 
with existing legally-recognized property interests.80  It cannot generally be relied 
upon in support of a claim to the recognition of forms of property which do not 
currently exist within a legal system.81 On the face of it, this limitation presents a 
serious obstacle to the author’s argument that Art 17 requires the recognition of a 
general adaptation right in European copyright law.  If we envisage each of the rights 
granted to an author under the acquis as a distinct property entitlement (reproduction 
right, rental right, communication to the public right, etc), any such claim would 
appear to be precluded. 
 
However, this may not be the only way of looking at this issue. If we view the various 
entitlements granted to creators as aspects of single integrated right to control the use 
of a work rather than as distinct, self-standing rights, the argument based on Art 17 
may be more plausible.  Under this approach, the claim to a general Union-level 
adaptation right for authors can be conceived as a claim to a specific form of right or 
interest (the right to control adaptation) which supports the author’s more general, 
undifferentiated interest in a creative work. As such, it may be possible to argue that 
the Union’s legislative acquis grants authorship status and a set of legislative rights to 
the creators of works and that the recognition of a particular authorial entitlement (the 
right to control adaptation of a work, for example) does not involve legal recognition 
of a distinct, previously unrecognized form of property. This analytical framework 
may seem to be at odds with the traditional approach to copyrights interests adopted 
in anglo-saxon jurisdictions, where the rights of authors have traditionally been 
																																																						
80 See Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; Fabris v France (2013) EHRR 19.  
81 See, for example, Klein v Austria (2014) 59 EHRR 14. 
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viewed as a series of separate legal entitlements rather than as specific instances of a 
more general ’author’s right’, but it is more in keeping with the theorisation of 
authors’ rights in most Member States. Importantly, it is also an approach which 
would also appear to underlie the treatment of the concept of ‘property’ or 
‘possessions’ in European fundamental rights law.82  
 
Nevertheless, there is a further potential obstacle in the way of a claim that Art 17 
supports the recognition of an adaptation right for authors in Union copyright law. 
The right of property under Art 17 and Art 1, Prot 1 is a right against interference 
with property and has rarely been held to impose a positive obligation of protection 
on a contracting state.83 This is problematic, as a claim to a ‘missing’ right, such as 
the right to control adaptation, requires a court to accept that an author’s legitimate 
entitlement had been interfered with through non-recognition. On the face of it, this 
would appear to be difficult. However, the Court’s recent case-law has muddied the 
distinction between the obligation not to interfere with a property right and the 
obligation positively to protect property. Indeed, it seems likely that, under the 
Court’s existing copyright jurisprudence, national courts have an obligation to act 
positively to protect authors against interferences committed by third parties. This is a 
reasonable inference from (C-275/06) Promusicae and subsequent cases concerning 
the obligation of internet intermediaries towards authors. Effectively, under the ‘fair 
balance’ approach laid down in those cases, national authorities must, at least in some 
circumstances, ensure the availability of some form of redress for third party 
interference with a work. 
																																																						
82 See, DJ Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed 
(OUP, 2014) 886. 
83 Ibid., 870-872. 
	 29	
 
While not explicitly theorized in this way, Promusicae appears to rely on the principle 
that a right-holder is entitled to effective redress for violation of fundamental rights. 
This position is more clearly apparent in the Court’s recent trade mark Judgment in 
(C-580/13) Coty Germany GmbH v Stadtparkasse Magdeburg. In the national 
proceedings in Coty, the trade mark owner sought personal identification data 
concerning a potential infringer from a bank which had received the proceeds of the 
potential infringement. The national court was concerned that the making of a 
disclosure order, although potentially supported by the Enforcement Directive, 84 
would conflict with rules on banking secrecy and with the customer’s right to data 
privacy. Explicitly relying on Promusicae, the Court held that a Member State was 
required to reconcile competing rights, both under Union secondary law and under the 
Charter. In this instance, however, the trade mark owner’s right to an effective 
remedy, as protected under Art 47 of the Charter was clearly recognized: 
 
The right to information which is intended to benefit the applicant in the 
context of proceedings concerning an infringement of his right to property 
thus seeks, in the field concerned, to apply and implement the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter, and 
thereby to ensure the effective exercise of the fundamental right to property, 
which includes the intellectual property right protected in Article 17(2) of the 
																																																						
84 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, Art 8(3)(e). 
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Charter….[T]he first of those fundamental rights is a necessary instrument for 
the purpose of protecting the second.85 
 
In the Court’s view, the ‘fair balance’ between competing rights in this situation 
precluded the application of a national rule systematically favouring the interest in 
banking secrecy by prohibiting the disclosure of personal data in all circumstances.86 
 
Husovec has argued that, in relying on Arts 47 and 17(2) in Coty, the Court extended 
the scope of the principle established in Promusicae by finding that, in some 
situations at least, a Member State will be obliged to implement disclosure orders 
against suspected infringers of intellectual property rights. 87  He also notes more 
generally that Coty confirms a positive obligation upon Member States to protect 
intellectual property rights and expresses concern about the potential expansionist 
consequences of this development. He argues that this recognition of positive 
obligations through the right of property is inconsistent with the structure of property 
guarantees enshrined in national constitutions and with the Court’s own jurisprudence 
on the secondary legislation applicable to copyright. 88  Nevertheless, the Court’s 
willingness to recognize a positive obligation to protect intellectual property deriving 
from the Charter in Coty offers potential support to the argument that Art 17 might 
provide the foundation for the recognition of ‘missing’ rights in the copyright acquis. 
																																																						
85 Case C-580/13 Coty Germany GmbH v Stadtparkasse Magdeburg [2015] 
EU:C:2015:485 para 29. 
86 Ibid., para 41. 
87 Cf Promusicae, in which the Court held that there was no requirement on a state to 
implement such a measure on the circumstances of that case. 
88 See M Husovec, ‘Intellectual property rights and integration by conflict: the past, 
present and future’ [2016] Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 239. For 
support for the former criticism, see also C Sganga, ‘EU Copyright Law Between 
Property & Fundamental Rights: a Proposal to Connect the Dots’ in  Caso and F 
Giovanella, Balancing Copyright Law in the Digital Age (Springer, 2015). 
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Arguably, such a claim goes beyond Coty, which concerned remedial protection as 
opposed to the grant of a right to control a particular form of use of the protected 
form. However, given the absence of a clearly disciplined framework of principle in 
the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence and the expansionist tendency in its 
copyright case-law, it does not seem impossible that the Court would be willing to 
take such a step. 
 
At the beginning of this section, it was explained that there is also a second potential 
question to be answered if a successful claim to an adaptation right based on Art 17 is 
to be established. Does such a claim lie within the scope of EU law - as required 
under Art 51 if the Charter is to apply?89 In fact, it can be suggested that, if the first 
question is answered in the manner outlined above, the second presents no real 
obstacle. If the various rights of authors are conceived as separate, free-standing 
property rights, questions concerning the availability of the adaptation right seem 
likely to fall within the scope of national law. However, if an author’s rights under the 
acquis are viewed as a composite group of entitlements giving rise to a positive 
obligation of protection (including protection against adaptation), a court recognising 
a general adaptation right for authors ought to be regarded as implementing EU law. 
Thus, if the first hurdle is surmounted, the second hurdle must necessarily also be 
cleared. 
 
The complex argument based on Art 17 could, of course, be by-passed if a court were 
simply willing to interpret the concept of ‘reproduction’ generously in favour of 
authors. Nevertheless, the Court has previously reinforced conclusions on the 
																																																						
89 For further discussion of Art 51, see A ward, ‘Article 51’ in S Peers et al, The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1413-1454. 
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interpretation of Union secondary legislation by reference to the Charter90 and the Art 
17 argument outlined here might, at least, offer attractive support to a court 
considering the potential generalisation of the adaptation right in Union copyright 
law. The rights established under the Charter might be used, at very least, to bolster a 
claim to extend the scope of the existing rights granted to authors in Union law in this 
way. Such a claim is not particularly controversial and is likely to be attractive to the 
Court. There is a fairly strong argument that the right is already implicit in the acquis 
and adaptation rights for authors are required under international treaty.91 They are 
also explicitly recognised in the national law of Member States and, in the case of 
certain categories of work, in Union law.   
 
 
b. A claim to the protection of moral rights? 
 
Could arguments based upon the fundamental rights protected under the Charter have 
even more dramatic effects than those outlined above? Could constitutionalization, for 
example, require the recognition of rights with a much weaker link to the existing 
secondary legislation, such as the moral rights granted to authors in national law? All 
Member States are obliged to provide such rights at a minimum level for creators and 
performers under international treaty but national laws take widely divergent forms.92 
However, as is well-known, moral rights are not harmonized within the Union. The 
																																																						
90 See Case C-277/10 Luksan v Van der Let [2012] EU:C:2012:65; Case C-510/10 
DR, TV2 Danmark AS v NCB – Nordisk Copyright Bureau [2012] EU:C:2012:244. 
91 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works 1886 (Paris Act), 
Article 12.    
92 For discussion of moral rights in national laws, see E Adeney, The Moral Rights of 
Authors & Performers (OUP, 2006); G Davies & K Garnett, Moral Rights, 2nd ed 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2016). 
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legislative acquis contains clear statements that such rights lie entirely outside the 
scope of the Directives in the field of copyright.93 Thus, on the face of it, questions 
relating to the entitlement of creators to the protection of the interests secured by 
moral rights continue to be governed by national law.94 On this basis, the argument 
that the Charter might support the recognition of such rights within Union law looks 
much less promising than that advanced in relation to the adaptation right above. 
However, let us apply the same two-stage structure of analysis outlined above to 
establish whether it is doomed to failure. 
 
At the first stage, then, it is necessary to ask whether a claim to moral rights 
protection is supported by any of the rights granted under the Charter. There is little 
direct authority on this question. While the European Court of Human Rights has 
reviewed the application of the ECHR in copyright cases,95 it has not yet had an 
opportunity to consider an application specifically focusing on creators’ moral rights. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that such rights are likely to be 
regarded as ‘possessions’ under the Convention. 96  The concept of property, or 
																																																						
93 See, for example, Recital 19 of the Information Society directive. The fact that 
protection of moral rights lies outside the acquis was noted by Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón in his Opinion in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn v Vandersteen [2013] 
EU:C:2014:2132 {AG 28]. 
94 Similar arguments to those set out here could be made for performers, who are 
entitled to certain moral rights under international law (WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty 1996, Art 5; WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances 
2012, Article 5). However, for simplicity’s sake, discussion in the text is restricted to 
authors. 
95 See, for example, Ashby Donald v France 36769/08, 10th January 2103 (ECtHR, 5th 
section); Neij v Sweden [2013] ECDR 7. 
96 This issue has been discussed in J Drexl, ‘Constitutional protection of authors’ 
moral rights in the European Union - between privacy, property and the regulation of 
the economy” in KS Ziegler (ed), Human Rights and Private Law. Privacy as 
Autonomy, Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law 5, (Hart 
Publishing, 2007) 159. Although, cf P Oliver & C Stothers, ‘Intellectual property 
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‘possessions’ in fundamental rights law is not restricted to interests described as such 
in national law. Accordingly, an author’s claim to have been deprived of those rights 
is likely to be ‘covered’ by a claim under Art 1, Prot 1 (and therefore by a claim under 
Art 17). However, as noted above, a distinction must be drawn between a right against 
interference with an existing property right, as protected under the European legal 
order, and a claim to recognition of a previously unavailable form of property.  
 
In considering the claim relating to the adaptation right, it has already been argued 
that it may be possible to theorize the collective entitlements of an author as a single 
broadly formulated form of property and individual rights to control specific activities 
(such as adaptation or communication to the public) as interests that Member States 
must recognize in pursuance of a positive obligation to protect the property in the 
work deriving from Art 17. It may be much harder to apply a similar logic to the non-
economic interests of authors. As a matter of practice, the explicit legislative 
statements that moral rights fall outside the acquis seem likely to make it harder to 
argue convincingly that the non-economic interests secured by those rights must be 
recognized in order to protect the author’s right(s) established in Union law. 
However, Art 17 may not be the only provision of the Charter upon which a claim to 
the recognition of moral rights could be founded. Other Charter rights do not share 
Art 17’s key limitation, in that their application is not restricted to situations 
concerning interferences with interests already recognised in positive law. Could it, 
for example, be argued that the freedom of the arts, protected under Art 13 of the 
Charter, inherently requires the recognition of authors’ moral rights?  
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One difficulty with such a claim is that the scope of protection offered by the freedom 
of the arts in EU law remains largely uncharted.97  It has been suggested that the right 
may simply be a specifically enumerated aspect of the more general right of freedom 
of expression and information protected under Art 11.98 If this is so, it may not prove 
a promising basis for the argument that the Charter requires the moral rights of 
authors and performers to be recognized in Union law. While a defendant in moral 
rights proceedings in a national court may well be able to rely on the right of freedom 
of expression, Art 11, ECHR (and thus Art 13 of the Charter) are less likely to apply 
to an author whose rights are not recognized within a legal system. As a matter of 
principle, the existence of moral rights may be supported by the right to freedom of 
expression because such rights are designed to protect the integrity of an author’s 
speech.99 However, the right of freedom of expression as it exists in the European 
legal order has not, as yet, been held to encompass a right not to speak in a particular 
manner. While this difficulty of principle may not be insuperable because the Court 
has typically adopted a fairly liberal approach to the Charter in the Court’s 
jurisprudence and it would not be surprising if it were to blur the theoretical 
distinction between the right to express oneself and the right not to do so. 
Nevertheless, authors may find it more fruitful to look elsewhere in the Charter for a 




97 For discussion, see D Sayers, ‘Freedom of the Arts & Sciences’ in S Peers et al, 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014) 379-
400. 
98 Ibid., 389. 
99 For discussion, see K Treiger-Bar-Am, ‘The Moral Right of Integrity: a Freedom of 
Expression’ in F Macmillan (ed), New Directions in Copyright, vol 2 (Edward Elgar, 
2005) 127; RR Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the 
United States (Stanford University Press, 2009).  
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Moral rights protect authors’ personal interests in copyright work. On that basis, the 
Charter rights that support the interests in human dignity (Art 1) or in respect for 
private life and communications (Art 7) may be worthy of further exploration.  Art 7 
(equivalent to Art 8, ECHR), may be particularly promising in this respect. While the 
Strasbourg Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider a specific complaint 
relating to failure to provide adequate protection for a creator’s personality rights in a 
creative work, its jurisprudence suggests that the interests at issue in such claims may 
well fall within the scope of Art 8, ECHR. In cases concerning national defamation 
proceedings, Art 8 has been held to cover reputational interests.100 The European 
Court of Human Rights has also held that a person’s interest in prohibiting the use of 
his or her name without consent is covered by Art 8.101 Such interests are not closely 
aligned with those protected under national moral rights laws and, on this basis, it 
seems reasonably likely that an author’s personality interests in his or her work would 
fall within Art 8, ECHR (and thus Art 7 of the Charter). On this basis therefore, at the 
first stage of analysis, this provision may well provide a potential foundation for a 
claim to the recognition of such interests in Union law. 
 
How would such an argument fare at the second stage of analysis applied in this 
chapter?  Would it be regarded as falling within the scope of EU law? On the face of 
it, this second hurdle would appear to present a serious obstacle. Consider, for 
example, a hypothetical situation in which an author believes that his or her moral 
																																																						
100 See, for example, Pfeifer v Austria (2007) 48 EHRR 175. 
101 See, for example, Ernst August von Hannover v Germany 53649/09, 19th February 
2015; Bohlen v Germany 53495/09, 19th February 2015. On the right to a name, see 
also Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 101; Case C-208/09) Sayn-
Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, [2010]  EU:C:2010:806.  
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rights are inadequately protected by the laws of a particular Member State.102 Could 
he or she argue that the Member State is obliged, as a matter of EU law, to furnish a 
higher level of protection in order to satisfy the requirements of Art 7? At first sight, 
this looks unlikely. Again, against the background of a series of explicit legislative 
statements that moral rights are not covered by the relevant Directives, it is difficult to 
see how a court considering such a challenge could be regarded as ‘implementing EU 
law’. Nevertheless, even though such a direct rights-based claim seems unlikely, it is 
possible that specific issues relating to the application of moral rights law in Member 
States might fall within the scope of EU law and, therefore, that the Charter may have 
a bearing in those proceedings. It is, of course, a long-established principle that the 
application of national rules derogating from the freedom of movement of goods and 
services falls under the scrutiny of the Court and, therefore, that the framework of 
fundamental rights is relevant in any assessment of the justification of such rules.103 
As a consequence, the rights protected under the Charter may at least have some 
relevance in cases concerning the application of moral rights.  
 
Consider a situation in which the circulation of published copies of a copyright work 
is impeded through the differential application of moral rights protection in Member 
States. What if, for example, the exercise of the moral right of retraction in France 
were to have an impact on the free movement of works published and distributed 
freely elsewhere in the Union?104 Alternatively, what if a claim based upon the moral 
right of integrity were to be relied upon by an author’s successors in order to restrict 
																																																						
102 The moral rights provisions of both the United Kingdom and Ireland have 
significant weaknesses from an author’s perspective.    
103 See Case C-390/12. Proceedings brought by Pfleger [2014] EU:C:2014:281, 3 
CMLR 47 paras30-37. 
104 For discussion of the moral right of retraction in French law, see G Davies & K 
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the distribution of copies of a work in which the copyright has long expired and 
which, as a result, are freely available in other Member States.105 In such situations, 
the application of national moral rights law would potentially create an impediment to 
the free movement of goods. In considering the justifiability of such restriction, a 
court applying EU law would be obliged to consider not only the application of the 
Union’s market freedoms but also to arrive at a fair balance between competing rights 
protected under the Charter - on the one hand, the rights of the author (or of his or her 
representatives) under Arts 7 or 13 and, on the other hand, the right to freedom of 
expression and/or the right to conduct a business of the undertaking seeking to exploit 
the work. 
 
The absorption of such issues into Union law would not have the same direct, 
harmonising potential as the recognition of ‘missing’ economic rights. A dispute 
relating to the application of national moral rights law in circumstances such as those 
outlined above might, at most, result in the trimming back of the national right and 
thus lead to an incremental form of downward harmonisation of national moral rights 
laws. It could not produce the type of gap-filling effects potentially observed in the 
case of the adaptation right. However, even such a modest impact or, indeed, even a 
finding that a national moral rights claim can be justified by reference to the Charter 
in a particular case could conceivably send a signal to the Union legislature – 
indicating both that the enforcement of moral rights at national level is capable of 
disrupting the internal market and inviting a legislative response. Such a response 
would, of course, have to be guided by the values established under the Charter. 
 
																																																						





My aim here has been to trace the process of constitutionalization in European Union 
copyright law to date and to consider some of its previously unnoticed potential 
consequences. There is clearly scope for more detailed examination of specific 
aspects of this process. 106  Constitutionalization has been welcomed by some 
scholars107 or, at least, has been considered an inevitable consequence of the Union’s 
current constitutional arrangements.108 Others have been more critical of the Court’s 
application of fundamental rights law in the copyright context.109 However, whatever 
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between copyright and fundamental rights in intermediary liability’ (2015-16) Info – 
the Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information 
& Media, 72. 
107 See, for example, C Geiger, ‘Constitutionalising’ intellectual property law? The 
influence of fundamental rights on intellectual property in the European Union’ 
[2006] IIC 371; A Ohly, ‘European fundamental rights & intellectual property’ in A 
Ohly and J Pila, The Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law (OUP, 2013) 145; 
C Geiger, ‘Fundamental rights as common principles of intellectual property 
enforcement’ in A Ohly (ed) Common Principles of European Intellectual Property 
Law (Mohr Sieback, 2012) 223; C Geiger, ‘Reconceptualising the constitutional 
dimension of intellectual property’ in P Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property & 
Human Rights, 3d ed (Kluwer Law International, 2015) 115. 
108 See, for example, C Angelopoulos, ‘Tracing the outline of a ghost: the fair balance 
between copyright and fundamental rights in intermediary liability’ (2015-16) Info – 
the Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information 
& Media, 72 
109 See, for example, J Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of 
Justice, the right of property and European copyright law’ (2013) European Law 
Review 65; T Mylly, ‘The constitutionalisation of the European legal order: impact of 
human rights on intellectual property in the EU’ in C Geiger (ed), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2015) 103; A 
Peukert, ‘The fundamental right to (intellectual) property and the discretion of the 
legislature’, in C Geiger (ed), Research Handbook, ibid., 132; C Sganga, ‘EU 
Copyright Law Between Property & Fundamental Rights: a Proposal to Connect the 
Dots’ in  Caso and F Giovanella, Balancing Copyright Law in the Digital Age 
(Springer, 2015); M Husovec, ‘Intellectual property rights and integration by conflict: 
the past, present and future’ (2016) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
239. 
	 40	
the perspective taken, it is reasonably clear that a strong commitment to the 
development of copyright law in accordance with the Charter is likely to have 
significant effects on Union copyright law in future. Overall, the enhanced status of 
the Charter shifts the balance of power from legislature to judiciary at both Union and 
national level. The force of rules deriving from secondary legislation has faded by 
comparison with the more flexible, but potentially also more powerful, requirements 
of the Charter. 
 
This shift places copyright law on principled constitutional foundations and brings 
certain pragmatic benefits. In recent years, the legislative reform of copyright law has 
become difficult because it takes place in such a hotly contested policy environment. 
The process of constitutionalization provides courts with powerful tools to develop 
the law in the absence of precise legislative instruction. Indeed, where necessary, it 
permits divergence from legislative provisions no longer considered appropriate. 
Nevertheless, courts applying Union law, and particularly the Court of Justice, must 
ensure that the potent tools with which they have been furnished are wielded carefully 
and consistently.110 The process of constitutionalization must not serve as a smoke-
screen for policy-based or pragmatic decision-making and must not result in outcomes 





110 See also, P Oliver & C Stothers, ’Intellectual property under the Charter: Are the 
Court’s scales properly calibrated?’ (2017) Common Market Law Review 
(forthcoming). 
